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GOLAN V. HOLDER:
CONGRESSIONAL POWER UNDER
THE COPYRIGHT CLAUSE AND
THE FIRST AMENDMENT
CLAIRE FONG*
I. INTRODUCTION
1

Golan v. Holder presents the question of whether Congress was
constitutionally permitted to pass Section 514 of the Uruguay Round
2
Agreements Act, a statute that “restored” copyright protection to
3
foreign works that had been free for public use for decades. The
Copyright Clause gives Congress the authority to create limited
4
monopolies in original works of authorship. As with all congressional
5
powers, however, the copyright power has its limits. These limits are
particularly important because copyright grants authors the exclusive
right to copy, distribute, and adapt their works, potentially denying the
6
public access to the “building blocks of future creativity.” Because the
public domain is restricted with each additional protection that
copyright provides, Congress must carefully balance the interests of
the American public with those of copyright holders in determining
7
the scope and duration of copyright protection. Over time, Congress
8
has shifted the balance increasingly in favor of copyright holders.
* J.D. Candidate, 2013, Duke University School of Law.
1. Golan v. Holder, No. 10-545 (U.S. argued Oct. 5, 2011).
2. Uruguay Round Agreements Act § 514, 17 U.S.C.A. § 104A (West 1994).
3. Brief for the Petitioners at 2, Golan v. Holder, No. 10-545 (U.S. June 14, 2011).
4. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991).
5. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966). Congress may only grant copyright to
original works. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc., 499 U.S. at 346 (“Originality is a constitutional
requirement.”). In addition, Congress may not grant perpetual copyrights. See Eldred v.
Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 209–10 (2003) (discussing the limited times constraint). Nor may it grant
copyright to ideas or disallow fair use without violating the First Amendment. See id. at 219–21
(declaring that the idea/expression dichotomy and fair use defense make copyright compatible
with the First Amendment).
6. Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 3, at 3–4.
7. Id. at 3.
8. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 200–01 (discussing two prior copyright term extensions in the
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9

Until now, courts have generally allowed it to do so.
In Golan v. Holder, the Supreme Court will determine whether
10
the Copyright Clause, or alternatively, the First Amendment,
prohibits Congress from restoring copyright to works in the public
domain. Golan v. Holder thus presents the Court with the opportunity
to place meaningful limits on the legislative expansion of copyright.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In April 1994, the United States signed the Agreement on Trade
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) as part of
11
the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
Among other things, the TRIPs agreement required that signatories
12
comply with Article 18 of the Berne Convention. Article 18 of the
13
Berne Convention requires the restoration of copyright to certain
foreign works that were previously in the public domain, but allows
14
each member nation to decide how to implement this requirement.
Pursuant to Article 18, foreign works that lost protection due to an
author’s failure to comply with registration, notice, or renewal
15
formalities must be restored to copyright. The TRIPs agreement also
provides for compulsory dispute resolution before the World Trade
Organization (WTO). A finding of noncompliance by the WTO could
16
lead to trade sanctions against the noncompliant state party.
context of the Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA), a third statute extending copyright
protection); see also United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1273–74 (11th Cir. 1999)
(discussing the constitutionality of the anti-bootlegging statute, which prohibited the recording
of live performances despite the fact that live performances are not fixed in a tangible medium);
United States v. Martignon, 492 F.3d 140, 141–42 (2d Cir. 2007) (finding the anti-bootlegging
statute constitutional, despite lack of compliance with the fixation and limited times
requirements).
9. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 194 (finding the CTEA constitutional); see also Moghadam, 175
F.3d at 1282 (finding the anti-bootlegging statute constitutional); Martignon, 492 F.3d at 153
(finding the anti-bootlegging statute constitutional).
10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
11. TRIPS: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, THE
LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE
NEGOTIATIONS 320 (1999), 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994).
12. Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076, 1080 (10th Cir. 2010).
13. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Mar. 1, 1989, 331
U.N.T.S. 217 [hereinafter Berne Convention].
14. Id. at 251.
15. Id.
16. Brief for the Respondents at 4, Golan v. Holder, No. 10-545 (U.S. Aug. 3, 2011). It
seems as though some countries take the threat of trade sanctions quite seriously. For example,
the first TRIPs case the United States submitted to the WTO alleged that Japan’s copyright
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Pursuant to the TRIPs agreement, Congress enacted the Uruguay
Round Agreements Act (URAA). Congress designed its
implementing legislation with the hope that other member nations
would reciprocate by providing the same protections to American
authors in their countries that the United States provided to foreign
17
authors through the URAA. Section 514 of the URAA restores
copyright protection to foreign works that have become part of the
public domain for any of the following reasons: (i) failure to comply
with U.S. registration formalities, (ii) lack of subject matter protection
18
for sound recordings, or (iii) lack of national eligibility. These foreign
works receive copyright protection for the remainder of the copyright
term they would have received in the United States had they never
19
entered the public domain. The URAA has no equivalent provisions
for works created by American authors, to whom it provides no direct
20
benefits.
Section 514 has the potential to severely limit the American
21
public’s right to use millions of foreign works. It provides some
temporary protection, however, for reliance parties, persons who
invested in the use of the works while they were in the public
22
domain. Foreign copyright holders who wish to enforce their
restored copyrights must either (i) provide a general notice through
the Copyright Office within two years of the date of restoration or (ii)
23
send notice directly to the reliance party. After the notice
regime was noncompliant because the term of protection that applied to retroactively granted
foreign sound recording copyrights was too short. Japan eventually agreed to amend its
copyright law. Elizabeth T. Gard, Copyright Law v. Trade Policy: Understanding the Golan
Battle Within the Tenth Circuit, 34 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 131, 152–53 (2011). The United States,
however, does not seem to take the trade sanctions as seriously. Although the WTO’s dispute
settlement body has found the United States in violation of the TRIPs agreement due to
exceptions that allow restaurants and bars to play music and television under certain
circumstances without paying royalty fees, the United States has not changed its copyright laws.
Instead, it pays a yearly fine for the violation. Elizabeth T. Gard, In the Trenches with § 104A:
An Evaluation of the Parties’ Arguments in Golan v. Holder as it Heads to the Supreme Court, 64
VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 199, 205 (2011).
17. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 16, at 52.
18. Uruguay Round Agreements Act § 514, 17 U.S.C.A. § 104A (West 1994).
19. Id. In the United States, the copyright term is the life of the author plus seventy years.
If the work is a work-for-hire, the copyright term lasts for ninety-five years after publication. 17
U.S.C.A. § 302 (1998).
20. Id.
21. Marybeth Peters, The Year in Review: Accomplishments and Objectives of the U.S.
Copyright Office, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 25, 31 (1996).
22. 17 U.S.C.A. § 104A (providing temporary protection for parties that relied on foreign
works by making copies of them for distribution or by making derivative works).
23. Id.
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requirement is satisfied, reliance parties have a one-year grace period
during which they may continue selling copies of the work that were
24
made prior to the notice of restoration. In addition, reliance parties
who created derivative works prior to restoration may continue to
exploit those derivative works if they pay “reasonable compensation”
25
to the owners of the restored copyrights.
In Golan v. Holder, Petitioners sold, performed, distributed, and
otherwise relied on foreign works in the public domain for their
26
livelihoods. They often chose works specifically because they were in
the public domain and would not require payment of licensing fees,
27
which Petitioners found to be cost-prohibitive. Section 514 restored
those works to copyright protection, requiring Petitioners to pay
28
licensing fees if they chose to continue using them.
Petitioners filed suit challenging the constitutionality of Section
514, arguing that its provisions exceeded the authority granted to
Congress in the Copyright Clause and required First Amendment
29
scrutiny. The district court granted summary judgment for the
30
Government on both issues. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding on the Copyright Clause,
but held that Section 514 was subject to First Amendment scrutiny
and remanded the case to the district court to apply the appropriate
31
analysis. On remand, the district court applied intermediate scrutiny
32
and concluded that Section 514 was unconstitutionally overbroad.
On appeal for the second time, the Tenth Circuit reversed and held
33
that Section 514 was constitutional.
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Petitioners in Golan v. Holder argue that Section 514 of the
URAA runs afoul of two constitutional limitations on congressional
power: the Copyright Clause and the First Amendment.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076, 1081–82 (10th Cir. 2010) (stating that “[p]laintiffs are
orchestra conductors, educators, performers, publishers, film archivists, and motion picture
distributors” who “perform, distribute, and sell public domain works”).
27. Id. at 1082.
28. Id.
29. See id. (discussing the procedural history of the case).
30. Id.
31. Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1189, 1197 (10th Cir. 2007).
32. Golan v. Holder, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1177 (D. Colo. 2009).
33. Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d at 1084, 1094.
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A. The Copyright Clause
While the Copyright Clause grants Congress the authority to
34
protect artistic works, this power comes with certain constraints. The
Copyright Clause states that “Congress shall have power . . . [t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
35
respective Writings and Discoveries.” This language implies a
36
number of limitations. For example, the preamble of the Clause,
requiring Congress to “promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts,” is the textual root for the utilitarian theory of copyright law,
37
which the Court has espoused for many years. Based on this view of
copyright, its immediate effect is to incentivize authors to create new
works by guaranteeing them the exclusive right to reap the economic
benefits of that work. Providing incentives to authors is not the
ultimate goal, however, but a means to a more important end: the
38
enrichment of the public domain. The requirement that copyrights
be granted for “limited Times” serves to achieve that goal. After
copyright expires and the work enters the public domain, any member
39
of the general public is free to use the work in any way he sees fit.
Through several recent legislative enactments, Congress has
considerably expanded copyright protections, and the courts have
40
proved reluctant to defend the public domain against that expansion.
One such legislative enactment is the Copyright Term Extension Act
41
(CTEA), which lengthened the term of copyright protection for both

34. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966).
35. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
36. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
37. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985)
(explaining that the “economic philosophy” behind copyright is that securing a “fair return” for
authors’ labor is the best way to achieve the ultimate aim of serving the public good); Feist
Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (stating that the primary objective
of copyright is to promote the progress of knowledge).
38. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 558.
39. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33–34 (2003).
40. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221–22 (2003) (characterizing the petitioners’
claims as “assert[ing] the right to make other people’s speeches” and stating that “the Copyright
Clause empowers Congress to determine the intellectual property regimes that . . . will serve the
ends of the Clause. . . . The wisdom of Congress’ action . . . is not within our province to secondguess”); see also United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1274–75 (11th Cir. 1999) (finding
the anti-bootlegging statute constitutional under the Commerce Clause, despite evidence that
Congress believed it was acting under the Copyright authority and despite lack of compliance
with the fixation and “limited Times” requirements); United States v. Martignon, 492 F.3d 140,
141–42 (2d Cir. 2007) (same).
41. Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA), Pub. L. No. 105-298, §§ 102(b), (d), 112 Stat.
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42

future and existing works by twenty years. Its constitutionality was
43
soon challenged in Eldred v. Ashcroft.
The petitioners in Eldred argued that the CTEA violated the
44
“limited Times” constraint and that granting copyright to existing
works could not possibly “promote the Progress of Science” because
authors did not need further incentive to create works that already
45
46
existed. The Supreme Court disagreed. The Court was unconvinced
by the petitioners’ argument that legitimizing this practice would
allow Congress to circumvent the “limited Times” requirement by
47
creating perpetual copyrights through repeated extensions. Instead,
the Court declared that “limited” did not mean “fixed” or
“inalterable” and found that copyrights under the CTEA would still
48
be limited by a specific expiration date. Because Congress had
extended the copyright term many times before and had applied each
new term to both future and existing works—and because past courts
had never objected—the Court found that Congress could continue
49
that practice. The Court believed that Congress deserved substantial
deference in the realm of copyright because it was not the judiciary’s
role to alter the delicate balance Congress strove to achieve through
50
its copyright policy. As a result, the Court upheld the CTEA.
B. The First Amendment
The First Amendment forbids Congress from making any law that
51
abridges the freedom of speech or expression. The right to free
speech, however, is not absolute. Although content-based regulations
52
of expression are subject to strict scrutiny, Congress has considerably
more leeway in passing laws that are content-neutral, which are only
53
subject to intermediate scrutiny. In determining whether a regulation
2827 (amending 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 302, 304).
42. CTEA §§ 102(b), (d).
43. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 193.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 211–12.
46. Id. at 199.
47. Id. at 208.
48. Id. at 199.
49. Id. at 202–04.
50. Id. at 204–05.
51. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
52. Under strict scrutiny, the government must prove that the speech-restricting law
furthers a compelling government interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898 (2010).
53. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994).
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is content-based or content-neutral, the primary consideration is
whether Congress enacted the regulation because of disagreement
54
with the content of the speech. If a statute is determined to be
content-neutral, to withstand intermediate scrutiny under the First
Amendment, it must “advance[] important governmental interests . . .
and [must] not burden substantially more speech than necessary to
55
further those interests.”
In Eldred, the petitioners argued that the CTEA was a content56
neutral regulation of speech that failed intermediate scrutiny. The
Supreme Court disagreed, holding that because the Copyright Clause
and the First Amendment were adopted close in time, copyright
57
generally will be compatible with free speech principles. In fact, the
Court declared that copyright is an “engine of free expression”
because its purpose is to promote the creation and publication of
58
ideas. In addition, copyright contains inherent First Amendment
protections such as the idea/expression dichotomy and an exception
59
for fair use. Thus, the Court held that unless Congress “altered the
traditional contours of copyright protection,” First Amendment
60
scrutiny of copyright laws was unnecessary.
IV. HOLDING
61

62

In Golan v. Gonzales and Golan v. Holder, the cases giving rise
to this litigation, the Tenth Circuit held that Section 514 did not
63
exceed Congress’s copyright authority and did not violate the First
64
Amendment.
In Golan v. Gonzalez, the Tenth Circuit disposed of Petitioners’
challenge under the Copyright Clause by following Eldred. It deferred
54. Id.
55. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 520 U.S. 180, 189 (1997).
56. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 218 (2003).
57. Id. at 219.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 219–20 (explaining that the idea/expression dichotomy, which distinguishes
between copyrightable expression and noncopyrightable ideas, and fair use, which affords the
public certain privileged uses of copyrighted work, are “built-in First Amendment
accommodations”).
60. Id. at 221.
61. Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2007).
62. Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 2010).
63. Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d at 1197 (holding that Section 514 does not exceed
Congress’s copyright authority).
64. Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d at 1094 (holding that Section 514 is consistent with the First
Amendment).
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to congressional judgment on the scope of copyright protection,
holding that as long as Congress exercises its authority rationally and
in a manner related to the goals of the Copyright Clause, courts
65
cannot intervene. Because Congress had passed Section 514 to
protect the rights of American authors abroad, the court found that
66
Congress had not exceeded its Copyright Clause authority.
The Tenth Circuit seemed more conflicted, however, about
Petitioners’ First Amendment challenge. In Golan v. Gonzales, the
court sought to determine what features of copyright represented its
67
“traditional contours” under Eldred. The court held that the term
68
“traditional” made reference to the historical treatment of copyright.
Because every statutory scheme prior to Section 514 had preserved
the same three-step sequence—from creation, to copyright, to the
public domain—it found that one of the “traditional contours” of
copyright was that works that entered the public domain remained
69
there. By removing works from the public domain, Section 514
70
violated this “time-honored tradition.”
The idea/expression
dichotomy and fair use defense could not alleviate the harm done to
Petitioners because unlike the works’ presence in the public domain,
these measures do not allow for completely unrestricted use of the
71
works. As a result, the court held that in passing Section 514,
72
Congress altered the traditional contours of copyright. The Tenth
Circuit remanded the case so the district court could apply a First
73
Amendment analysis. On remand, the parties stipulated that Section
74
514 was a content-neutral regulation of speech. The district court
75
applied intermediate scrutiny and found the statute unconstitutional.
A year later, the Tenth Circuit reversed this ruling in Golan v.
76
Holder, holding that Section 514 passed intermediate scrutiny. The
court found that a substantial government interest existed because
65. Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d at 1187.
66. Id. at 1186–87.
67. The Supreme Court was never explicit about what it meant by the “traditional
contours” of copyright, except that they included the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use
defense. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219–21 (2003).
68. Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d at 1188–89.
69. Id. at 1189.
70. Id. at 1192.
71. Id. at 1194–95.
72. Id. at 1192.
73. Id. at 1197.
74. Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076, 1082 (10th Cir. 2010).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1080.
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certain foreign countries’ refusal to grant copyright to American
works harmed the expressive and economic interests of American
77
authors. The court’s analysis relied heavily on industry testimony
heard during the URAA congressional hearings. The testimony stated
that Section 514’s retroactive grant of copyright protection to foreign
works would encourage other countries to enact similar legislation,
thereby resulting in preservation of the rights of American copyright
78
holders.
In determining whether Congress had sufficient evidence to
conclude that Section 514 would alleviate a real harm, the court
79
focused on the deference it owed Congress on this issue. The court
was obliged to show substantial deference to Congress’s predictive
judgments not only because of Congress’s greater ability to “evaluate
the vast amounts of data bearing upon . . . legislative questions” and
“its authority to exercise the legislative power,” but also because
80
Section 514 relates to foreign affairs.
The court then determined that Section 514 did not burden
substantially more speech than necessary because the burdens
imposed on Petitioners were congruent with the benefits given to
81
American authors. That other countries had chosen different
structures for similar regulations was irrelevant because narrow
tailoring does not require Congress to reach its end through the least82
restrictive means. As a result, the court held that Section 514 did not
83
violate the First Amendment.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on two issues: (i) whether
the Copyright Clause prohibits Congress from taking works out of the
public domain, and (ii) whether Section 514 violates the First
84
Amendment.

77. Id. at 1084.
78. Id. at 1087–88. The Government argues that this prediction proved to be true and cites
Russia’s restoration of copyright for American authors as proof. Brief for the Respondents,
supra note 16, at 51.
79. Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d at 1084–85.
80. Id. (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 520 U.S. 180, 195–96 (1997)).
81. Id. at 1091.
82. Id. at 1092.
83. Id. at 1094.
84. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Golan v. Holder, No. 10-545 (U.S. Mar. 7, 2011).
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V. ARGUMENTS
A. Congress’s Power under the Copyright Clause
1. Petitioners’ Arguments
Petitioners have three main arguments. First, that Section 514
violates the “limited Times” constraint. Second, that Section 514 is
inconsistent with the language of the preamble. And finally, that the
history of the Copyright Clause demonstrates that Congress cannot
remove works from the public domain.
Petitioners first argue that Section 514 violates the Copyright
Clause’s requirement that copyright protection be granted for only
85
“limited Times.” They assert that authorizing Congress to remove
works from the public domain would render the limited times
requirement meaningless by allowing copyright to be “resurrected at
86
any time, even after it expires.” Petitioners distinguish this case from
Eldred by stating that although an extended copyright term may still
87
be limited by a definitive outer boundary, that is not the case here.
They argue that for the copyright term to be “limited,” the entry of a
work into the public domain must signal “the end of protection, not
88
an intermission.”
Petitioners’ second argument asserts that Section 514 contravenes
the preamble of the Copyright Clause, which states that copyright
89
must “promote the Progress of Science.” Petitioners argue that by
allowing Congress to restore copyright to foreign works, the Court
would not only destroy Petitioners’ reliance interests, but would set
precedent that would interfere with the public’s ability to rely on
90
public domain works in the future. This uncertainty would
91
undermine the progress the Copyright Clause seeks to promote. In
addition, by restricting the public’s ability to use previously available
works, Section 514 impoverishes the public domain of material that
92
was being used to spur the creation of further artistic works. Section
514 makes these sacrifices in order to grant protection to works that

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 3, at 22.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 24.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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have long been in existence and thus does not encourage the creation
93
of new works.
Finally, Petitioners argue that the history of copyright confirms
94
that Congress cannot take works out of the public domain.
According to Petitioners, Congress has amended the Copyright Act
nineteen times and each time has made sure to preserve the contents
95
of the public domain. Petitioners contend that any exceptions to this
rule were the result of unusual circumstances, like war or the
96
correction of legal errors. Although the Eldred Court looked to
historical practice in upholding the CTEA, Petitioners argue that in
this case tradition compels the opposite result—a finding of
97
unconstitutionality.
2. The Government’s Arguments
The Government asserts three arguments in response. First, that
“limited Times” does not mean that the copyright term is inalterable.
Second, that the preamble is not an independent limitation on
Congress’s copyright powers. And third, that history demonstrates
that Congress has granted retroactive copyrights on numerous
occasions in the past.
The Government emphasizes the Eldred Court’s finding that
“limited Times” does not require a “fixed” or “inalterable” expiration
98
date. Because the copyrights restored by Section 514 will still expire
on the same date they would have expired had the works never
entered the public domain, the Government argues that Section 514 is
consistent with the limited times requirement.
In response to Petitioners’ claim that the preamble is an
independent limitation on Congress’s powers, the Government

93. Id.
94. Id. at 20. See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33–34
(2003) (stating that “[t]he rights of a . . . copyright holder are part of a ‘carefully crafted
bargain,’ under which, once the . . . copyright monopoly has expired, the public may use the . . .
work at will and without attribution” (internal citations omitted)).
95. Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 3, at 31.
96. Reply Brief for the Petitioners at 9–11, Golan v. Holder, No. 10-545 (U.S. Aug. 31,
2011). In their brief, Petitioners argue that the only instances in which Congress deviated from
its traditional practice of preserving the public domain were (1) to allow foreign authors more
time to register their works when World War I and World War II made it difficult for them to
do so, and (2) to correct inadvertent errors on the part of the applicant or the Copyright Office.
Id.
97. Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 3, at 31.
98. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 16, at 28.
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99

stresses that no court has ever interpreted it in this way. Instead, the
Government argues that under Eldred, the Copyright Clause
empowers Congress, not the judiciary, to determine what balance is
100
appropriate to “promote the Progress of Science.”
Lastly, the Government refutes Petitioners’ argument that
historical practice suggests any limitation on Congress’s power to
remove works from the public domain. According to the Government,
the Copyright Act of 1790 granted copyright to many existing works
that did not qualify for protection under state laws or the common
101
law. Because state law and common law were the only forms of
copyright protection prior to the Copyright Act of 1790, the
Government contends that the First Congress believed that removing
102
works from the public domain was constitutional. The Government
also points to various occasions on which Congress restored copyright
and patent protection to individual works and inventions, as well as to
copyright-restoring laws passed during World Wars I and II to allow
authors more time to register their works given the exigencies of
103
war. The Government therefore argues that history demonstrates
that removing works from the public domain is within the scope of
104
Congress’s powers.
B. Whether Section 514 Violates the First Amendment
1. Petitioners’ Arguments
Petitioners argue that Section 514 should be subject to First
Amendment scrutiny because it alters the traditional contours of
copyright. They then argue that Section 514 fails intermediate scrutiny
either because none of Congress’s interests reach the level of an
important government interest or because Section 514 burdens more
speech than necessary to achieve those interests.
Petitioners assert that under Eldred, Section 514 should be subject
to First Amendment scrutiny because it alters the traditional contours
of copyright by violating the time-honored principle that works in the

99. Id. at 16.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 20–21.
102. Id. at 21.
103. Id. at 24, 26 (citing the Act of Feb. 19, 1849 (Corson Act), ch. 57, 9 Stat. 763; Act of
June 23, 1874 (Helmuth Act), ch. 534, 18 Stat. 618; Act of Feb. 17, 1898 (Jones Act), ch. 29, 30
Stat. 1396; Act of July 3, 1832, ch. 162, § 3, 4 Stat. 559; Act of Mar. 3, 1893, ch. 215, 27 Stat. 743).
104. Id. at 23.
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105

public domain remain there. They argue that the two built-in free
106
speech safeguards that the Supreme Court identified in Eldred are
inadequate to protect their First Amendment rights in this case. While
the public may use the entirety of public domain works and may
harvest both the ideas and expression of those works, the
idea/expression dichotomy and fair use defense only allow for limited
107
use of copyrighted works. As a result, Section 514 must be subject to
108
First Amendment scrutiny.
Petitioners then contend that Section 514 fails intermediate
109
scrutiny under the First Amendment. They deny that any of the
Government’s stated interests rise to the level of an important
110
government interest. Petitioners argue that granting foreign authors
copyright in public domain works is, at best, an indirect means of
protecting the rights of American authors, and that Congress based its
111
predictions on insufficient evidence.
In response to the Government’s stated interest in complying with
the Berne Convention, Petitioners assert that the United States could
112
have done so without removing any works from the public domain.
Petitioners state that in 1988, when the United States joined the
Berne Convention, Congress determined that the United States could
comply with the Convention’s requirements without restoring any
113
copyrights. Petitioners believe that the present Congress should
abide by that determination. In the alternative, Petitioners argue that
even if Berne does require the United States to restore copyright in
foreign works, Section 514 burdens substantially more speech than
114
necessary. Petitioners maintain that Article 18 allows Congress
significant discretion. They assert that under Article 18, the United
States can negotiate agreements excepting it from the restoration
requirement or, alternatively, can pass laws providing for the
115
permanent protection of reliance parties. Petitioners also assert that
105. Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 3, at 43.
106. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219–20 (2003) (explaining that the idea/expression
dichotomy and fair use are “built-in First Amendment accommodations”).
107. Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 3, at 46–47.
108. Id. at 47.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 48.
111. Id. at 49–50.
112. Id. at 52.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 54.
115. Id. at 55–56.
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Congress could have limited the copyright term for restored works to
whichever copyright period is shorter: the period in the nation in
116
which the work was created or the period in the United States.
2. The Government’s Arguments
The Government argues that Section 514 does not alter the
117
traditional contours of copyright protection. It maintains that the
idea/expression dichotomy and fair use defense are the only features
of copyright law that the Eldred Court referred to as “traditional
118
contours.” Because both the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair
use defense are preserved under Section 514, no First Amendment
119
scrutiny is necessary.
If, however, the Court finds that Section 514 is subject to
intermediate scrutiny, the Government maintains that it would satisfy
120
such review. The Government asserts that important governmental
interests motivated the passage of Section 514. Specifically, Congress’s
goal was not only to protect American authors’ copyrights abroad, but
to secure them the specific protections it gave to foreign authors in
121
Section 514. In addition to being in actual compliance with the
Berne Convention, the Government contends that it is essential that
other member nations perceive the United States as honoring the
spirit of Berne’s terms because of the World Trade Organization
122
dispute resolution provided for in TRIPs. Even if the Court
disagrees with these assessments, the Government argues that
because Congress is owed substantial deference in matters of
predictive judgments and foreign affairs, the Court should not second123
guess the legislature’s decisions.
The Government then argues that Section 514 does not burden
substantially more speech than necessary to achieve Congress’s
124
interests. It maintains that the methods of compliance Petitioners
propose would undermine foreign nations’ perception that the United
States is in compliance with Berne and make the United States

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id. at 59–60.
Brief for the Respondents, supra note 16, at 37.
Id.
Id. at 37–38.
Id. at 42.
Id. at 52.
Id. at 44.
Id. at 42–43.
Id. at 49.
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vulnerable to trade sanctions. It also rejects these alternatives
because Section 514 was written under the assumption that other
countries would reciprocate the specific scope and extent of restored
127
copyright protections.
VI. ANALYSIS AND LIKELY DISPOSITION
The Supreme Court is likely to affirm the Tenth Circuit’s decision
and uphold the constitutionality of Section 514. This result would be
consistent with Eldred and other recent cases construing Congress’s
power to enact copyright statutes, all of which suggest that the
judiciary is incredibly deferential to Congress’s policy judgments in
this area. Finding Section 514 unconstitutional, however, would be the
better outcome, both in terms of ensuring that the boundaries of
copyright law remain intact and in terms of adopting a policy that will
promote the creation of new works.
Because Petitioners’ arguments under the Copyright Clause are
reminiscent of those made by the petitioners in Eldred, the Court is
unlikely to find them convincing. The Court is likely, however, to
reach a First Amendment analysis. Though the Government has
managed to muster up some historical evidence of retroactive
copyright grants, that historical evidence is exceptional enough for the
Court to find that Section 514 alters copyright’s traditional contours.
Still, the Court is unlikely to find that Congress transgressed the
bounds of the discretion it is entitled under intermediate scrutiny.
Though the arguments raised by Petitioners under the Copyright
Clause seem more compelling in this case than in Eldred, their
preambular argument probably is precluded by that Court’s holding.
In Eldred, the Court conceded that promoting the progress of
128
knowledge is the “primary objective of copyright.” It rejected the
argument, however, that the CTEA ran contrary to that objective
because it is for Congress, not the courts, to determine what
intellectual property regime will best achieve the “promote the
125. Id. at 47–48.
126. See supra Part V.B.1. (stating Petitioners’ arguments that Congress could have (i)
contracted around the Berne Convention’s requirements by making agreements with other
nations, (ii) provided for permanent protection of reliance parties, or (iii) limited copyright
protection to the shorter copyright period, whether that be the term in the United States or the
term in the country of origin).
127. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 16, at 52.
128. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 (2003) (quoting Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel.
Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991)).
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129

Progress” aim. In addition, the Court stated that “[t]he profit motive
130
is the engine that ensures the progress” of knowledge. In Golan,
therefore, the Court is unlikely to perceive the additional rights
Section 514 grants to foreign authors as being given at the expense of
the American public.
If, however, the Court upholds Section 514, the preamble would
be rendered inconsequential. It is inconceivable how Section 514’s
restoration of copyright could possibly “promote the Progress.” The
works protected by Section 514 were not only already created, but by
removing them from the public domain, Congress stifled any further
“Progress” they could have promoted. In addition, the statute
threatens the future integrity of the public domain in a way that
discourages others from using it to create new works in the future. If
Congress is constitutionally permitted to remove works from the
public domain, the public may be uncomfortable relying on these
131
works. This defeats the purpose of the public domain and the entire
copyright regime. Section 514 not only fails to “promote the Progress
of Science,” but also eradicates progress that has already occurred. By
threatening the integrity of the public domain, it severely impedes
future progress. Though strengthening copyright holders’ rights can
arguably serve to “promote the Progress” by encouraging authors to
put more effort into their works, that is not true in this case—the
works at issue under Section 514 are works that already exist.
The limited times argument will be a more difficult issue for the
Court because the Eldred Court assigned great weight to Congress’s
unbroken practice of retroactively extending the copyrights of
132
existing works. Here, the historical pattern is less clear and the
133
parties offer conflicting accounts of the historical record. However,
the Government’s historical arguments—that the First Congress
restored copyrights with the Copyright Act of 1790 and that early
Congresses restored copyright and patent protection to individual
works and inventions that had entered the public domain—may be
129. Id. at 212–13.
130. Id. at 212 (quoting American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1, 27
(S.D.N.Y. 1992)).
131. Brief of Public Domain Interests as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 28–37,
Golan v. Holder, No. 10-545 (U.S. June 20, 2011).
132. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 200–01, 209–10, 213.
133. Compare Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 3, at 31–41 (arguing that history
demonstrates an unbroken congressional practice of preserving the public domain), with Brief
for the Respondents, supra note 16, at 18–32 (arguing that history proves that Congress has
removed works from the public domain in the past).
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significant to the Court. The Court may be persuaded by the
Government’s argument because of its affinity for such historical
134
evidence. Still, relying too heavily on this evidence would be a
mistake. If removing works from the public domain is not
135
unprecedented, it is at least unusual. And even if the Court accepts
the Government’s argument that Congress has established a historical
practice of removing works from the public domain, “no one acquires
a vested or protected right in violation of the Constitution by long
use, even when that span of time covers our entire national
136
existence.”
To the extent the Court engages in a textual interpretation of the
Copyright Clause, it is likely to rule in the Government’s favor. In
Eldred, the Court stated that “limited” did not mean “fixed” or
137
“inalterable”; instead, it noted that an extended term still had a
138
definite expiration date. Similarly, the copyright term for restored
works is still limited to the term that would have applied had the
139
works not fallen out of copyright. This is likely to satisfy the Court’s
definition of “limited.” It seems clear, however, that Section 514 does
in fact cross constitutional boundaries. If Congress can retroactively
restore copyright to works in the public domain, it is difficult to
imagine what it cannot do. Construing “limited Times” in this way
140
would rob the phrase of any meaning.
Though the Court is unlikely to find merit in Petitioners’
Copyright Clause arguments, it is likely to reach the First Amendment
analysis. If it does, this will be the first time the Court has done so in
141
Petitioners’ First Amendment claims,
the copyright context.
however, are unlikely to prevail. Though they may succeed in

134. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 201–03 (finding it “significant” that early Congresses extended
the duration of numerous individual patents and copyrights).
135. Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1192 (2007) (“[O]ur examination of the history of
American copyright law reveals that removal [of works from the public domain] was the
exception rather than the rule.”).
136. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 236 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S.
664, 678 (1970)).
137. Id. at 199.
138. Id.
139. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 16, at 10–11.
140. Tyler T. Ochoa, Is the Copyright Public Domain Irrevocable? An Introduction to Golan
v. Holder, 64 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 123, 144–45 (2011) (stating that the “limited Times”
restriction in the Copyright Clause “will be rendered a dead letter” if Congress can restore
copyrights).
141. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221 (discussing how “copyright’s built-in free speech safeguards
are generally adequate to address [First Amendment concerns]” in the copyright area).
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convincing the Court that First Amendment review is warranted, they
are unlikely to persuade it that Congress’s actions should fail
intermediate scrutiny.
Under Eldred, Petitioners must prove that Section 514 alters the
“traditional contours of copyright protection” in order to obtain First
142
Amendment scrutiny. Unfortunately, the Eldred Court did not
clarify exactly what it meant by copyright’s “traditional contours.”
Because Eldred depended on the belief that the Copyright Clause and
143
the First Amendment are inherently compatible, whether the
Supreme Court agrees with Petitioners’ or the Government’s
interpretation will depend on what aspects of copyright it considers
fundamental to copyright’s free speech compatibility. The history of
144
copyright is also likely to weigh heavily in its analysis. Though it
seems clear that the Court’s definition of “traditional contours” will
encompass more than the idea/expression dichotomy and fair use
145
exception, it is less obvious that the integrity of the entire contents
of the public domain will make the Court’s list. As mentioned
previously, the historical record is not wholly supportive of the
proposition that Congress has never removed works from the public
146
domain. However, because Petitioners were previously able to make
unrestricted use of the entirety of the newly restored works and must
now pay to do so, Section 514 burdens their speech in a way that
cannot be rectified by the idea/expression dichotomy or fair use
exception, neither of which allow for completely unrestricted use of
147
those works.
Even if the Court finds that Section 514 has altered the
“traditional contours of copyright protection,” the statute is unlikely
to be struck down. Because the parties agree that Section 514 is
148
content-neutral, it will be subject to intermediate scrutiny. The
Supreme Court is almost certain to find the avoidance of trade
sanctions and the protection of American authors’ rights abroad to be
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. See Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1189 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he Eldred Court's use
of the word ‘traditional’ to modify ‘contours’ suggests that Congress's historical practice with
respect to copyright and the public domain must inform our inquiry.”).
145. For example, because it is constitutionally required, the originality requirement
certainly qualifies as a traditional contour of copyright protection.
146. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 16, at 18–31.
147. Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d at 1194–95.
148. See Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076, 1083 (10th Cir. 2010) (stating that content-neutral
speech receives intermediate scrutiny).
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149

important government interests. The question of whether the statute
burdens substantially more speech than necessary is more difficult. To
satisfy this standard, a statute need not be the least-restrictive means
150
of achieving the government’s stated interest. As a result, the
151
existence of less burdensome alternatives is not dispositive. Because
this standard is somewhat flexible, the amount of legislative deference
the Court believes is appropriate will be important in deciding the
issue. As this is a complex matter concerning both the structure of the
copyright regime and foreign relations, the Court is likely to defer
152
substantially to Congress’s decision-making authority. Especially
153
considering the concessions the statute makes to reliance parties,
the Court is unlikely to find that Congress went so far outside the
scope of its discretion that it failed to tailor the statute narrowly
154
enough to pass intermediate scrutiny.
Nevertheless, as Petitioners argue in their brief, by virtue of the
United States signing the Berne Convention, American copyright
holders were already guaranteed protection for their new works in all
155
member nations. Though it may not have been ideal that they
lacked protection for their previously created works, this problem
would have solved itself with time because those works eventually
would have fallen into the public domain. By contrast, setting a
precedent that would allow Congress to remove works from the
public domain and restore them to copyright at any time in the future
would seriously undermine the integrity of the public domain in a way
156
that could permanently stifle its use by the public.

149. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 520 U.S. 180, 195 (1997) (stating that in assessing
the importance of the government’s interest and whether the challenged statute addresses and
alleviates a real harm, Congress is entitled to “substantial” deference).
150. Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d at 1092.
151. Id.
152. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 222 (2003) (“[T]he Copyright Clause empowers
Congress to determine the intellectual property regimes that, overall, in that body’s judgment,
will serve the ends of the Clause . . . . The wisdom of Congress’ action [] is not within our
province to second-guess.” (emphasis added)); see also Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council,
530 U.S. 363, 386 (2000) (“We have . . . consistently acknowledged that the ‘nuances’ of the
foreign policy of the United States . . . are much more the province of the Executive Branch and
Congress than of this Court.” (internal citations omitted)).
153. Uruguay Round Agreements Act § 514, 17 U.S.C.A. § 104A (West 1994).
154. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 520 U.S. at 213 (“Content-neutral regulations do not pose
the same inherent dangers to free expression that content-based regulations do, and thus are
subject to a less rigorous analysis, which affords the Government latitude in designing a
regulatory solution.” (emphasis added) (citations omitted)).
155. Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 3, at 52.
156. Brief of Public Domain Interests as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, supra note
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While international harmonization and robust foreign trade are
important, the effect of those goals on the United States’s copyright
157
framework must be limited. The Tenth Circuit’s opinion in Golan v.
Holder is replete with concerns about trade, but lacking in copyright
158
considerations. The Copyright Clause and the First Amendment
were fashioned to protect important interests. Those interests and the
demands of the Constitution cannot be so easily brushed aside in the
pursuit of trade.

131, at 39–40.
157. Gard, Copyright Law v. Trade Policy: Understanding the Golan Battle Within the Tenth
Circuit, supra note 16, at 189.
158. See Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076, 1085–89 (10th Cir. 2010) (discussing testimony on
the importance of Section 514 to American interests in foreign countries).

